As the narrative of globalization in crisis heats up, China has stepped up as a new champion of globalization with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This article repositions 'China in the Global South' to the front and center of the globalization discourse. Through a triangular framework, I differentiate and reconnect the three 'master' processes of urbanization, development and globalization to understand the inside-outside connections between China's domestic transformation and strong impact in the Global South. Using China vs. Southeast Asia and Central Asia, I evaluate if and how China's inside-out strategy can catalyze mutually beneficial development across some Asian borderlands and beyond.
Introduction
Globalization is an inherently uneven spatial process that tracks the unequal cross-national distribution of economic and political power. This power is leveraged by certain dominant nations' comparative and competitive strengths during given eras of world history. Increasingly, dominant global influence from certain nation states has shifted toward their powerful global cities or other cities of strategic and special functions. The overlap and mismatch between national and urban power creates more complex spatial inequalities at the regional and local levels. It however can also generate cooperative tendencies to counter and ameliorate unequal development and spatial disparity.
These shifts and their consequences raise new questions about how to understand the two basic dimensions of national versus city based influence on nearby and faraway places and people: scale and connectivity. While scale represents important attributes of discrete origins or locales of power, connectivity embodies the relational aspect of influence. The greater scale and scope of power originates from more strategic locations, more key points of contacts and their stronger spillovers. Stronger connectivity of power stems from the larger number, more variety and greater intensity of connections that are both virtual through financial networks and physical via transport links. Relative to the heavy focus on the power and connectivity of global financial networks, the latter deserve our renewed attention in light of China's infrastructure-led approach to globalization treated in this paper.
While the scale and connectivity of power underpin the more conventional reach and impact of globalization, their continued importance has recently been entangled with the shifting political ideologies of existing powerful states that have also been the biggest drivers of globalization. With the rhetoric of 'America First' and withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the United States under President Trump has taken a big step back from globalization. Although Brexit may not be exactly anti-global, this move reflects a backlash against the practices of globalization such as open borders and immigration.
These retreats from globalization look like temporary setbacks from the long history of globalization. Taking a very long view, Chanda (2007) world economy (see Chen, 2005) . Globalization has since moved up a big notch measured in trade as a share of the world's GDP, which rose from 39% in 1980 to 60% in 2008.
1 Despite the global financial crisis in 2008, globalization measured in the composite Global Connectedness Index rebounded through 2015 (Ghemawat, 2017) .
As globalization becomes more intensified, it has brought to light the negative consequences such as the erosion of national sovereignty and growing income inequality. Looking back through the lens of the Great Depression, James (2008) found an important part of its cause in the resentment against global capital flows, trade and migration and drew this as a lesson for contemporary globalization. Critiquing globalization as a paradox from a Western perspective, Rodrik (2011) contends that economic globalization cannot co-exist with both democratic politics and national sovereignty, either of which must be sacrificed for pursuing globalization.
Having benefited considerably from globalization, China has become a counter to this paradox. It has pursued globalization with a strong single Party-state, which does not have to worry about the erosion of democracy or loss of sovereignty. China has also gained considerable confidence and stature from becoming more globally connected and integrated. Against the analysis beyond the existing literature on globalization, principally because China is a distinctive global power driven by a strong state. With a dual identity as both a leading global power and a large developing nation, at least for much of its interior, China's approach to globalization calls for fresh analysis. This paper meets this scholarly challenge by examining China's leading role in shaping a new era of globalization via its widespread and yet geographically concentrated influence in the Global South.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section develops an integrated framework for understanding the sources, mechanisms and effects of Chinese globalization emphasiing its inside-out dialectic logic. I intend the framework to clarify the distinctive, if not exceptional, combination of China's internal and external regional conditions that has catalyzed its global initiatives across various Asian borderlands. The framework is then used to guide a pair of case studies focused on Southeast Asia and Central Asia for comparing how China's global strategies are reshaping urban and regional landscapes around its borderlands and far beyond. The last section explores the broader implications from the interface between the framework and two case analyses.
Decoding China's impact in the Global South
To the extent that we see the current phase of globalization in some kind of crisis and China as a counter force to it, it invokes the translation of the English word 'crisis' into the Chinese language (危机), whose two characters literally mean 'crisis-opportunity'. There may be a
Chinese philosophical dialectic ring to the translation in conveying a sense of contradiction or balance. If globalization is in crisis, real or perceived, it can be accompanied by a set of new opportunities for creating an alternative approach to globalization associated with by China's development policies and practices over the last three decades.
The scale dimension of China's global economic power is obvious. With a continental sized territory and world's largest population, China sustained the largest share of the world's GDP and peaked at around 35% by 1820, far ahead of the relative positions of the Western industrializing economies at that time). Having dropped to about 3% by 1980, China's weight of the world's GDP returned to around 15% today, two centuries after its historical zenith. 2 The combined force of reform, opening and transformation over only three decades has elevated China to: a) the world's second largest economy; b) the world's largest trading nation; c) the world's largest exporter; d) the world's largest manufacturer; e) the world's largest energy consumer; f) the world's largest auto market; g) the world's largest user of steel, cement and copper; and h) the world's largest applicant for patents. All these superlatives magnify the scale dimension of China's global economic power, but they tell us little about how these top rankings of China's strength translate into real impact and how and where this impact is truly felt. Scale of power coupled with its connectivity is key to understanding China's multifaceted influence across the Global South.
The large scale of economic power generally translates into an extensive connectivity of that power, even though this association is not always linear, and is instead contingent on how a given nation or city projects its internal strength in forming external connections carrying and extending a powerful influence. It also depends on how we think about measuring the correlation between scale and connectivity of a new and different global power like China. As China grew into the world's top trading nation, trade as a share of its GDP, a more conventional measure of trade dependency or connectivity, rose from 9% in 1960s to 37% in 2016. 3 While this was a big increase, from a time when China was basically closed to world trade, China's current share of its GDP is expectedly small relative to its overall economic scale. It is smaller than the world's average of 58% and even slightly lower than India's 40%, while the export manufacturing powerhouse of Germany registered at 84% for 2016. 4 Looking at global economic power from a different comparative vantage point, the number of countries for which China is the largest trading partner stands at 124 relative to 56 for the United States (Khanna, 2016, Map 2 China is geographically endowed and positioned to do so. Favorable geographical conditions, however, are insufficient for enhancing the scale of power through extending its connectivity unless they are activated by domestic economic forces. To fully understand this set of factors inside and outside the Chinese context, we propose a tripartite framework below.
Triangulating China's inside and outside
In the academic and policy scholarship on China's global rise and impact, there is a tendency to emphasize the scale and scope of China's quest for commodities and energy, massive trade, growing outward investment, and extensive infrastructure provision in the Global South (see Cardenal and Araújo, 2013; Economy and Levi, 2014; French, 2014) . This prevalent narrative often leads to an inflated view that China's rise will inevitably weakens the Western (US) dominance (Jacques, 2012) in a multipolar world, although others have tempered this view by pointing to the possibility of constraining China's partial global power (Christensen, 2015; Shambaugh, 2013) .
To regionalize the discussion and analysis of China's global impact, we need to recontextualize it in the continued discourse and debate about the "Asian Century" that has been alive since the 1980s when Japan instead of China was the rising Asian power. Its nuances aside, the 'Asian Century' debate features a persistent split between two camps representing the euphoric and alarming sides, with China's rise and its regional impact looming large on both sides. From the cheering side, Mahbubani (2008) Moving beyond the more conventional debate, Anaya Roy (2016) has turned our analytic gaze toward the set of flows and transactions crossing more intra-Asian boundaries that make the region less geographically bounded in nation states and more in terms of interreferenced urban and regional spaces. In shifting the central research question 'Where is Asia' to 'When is Asia', Roy has opened up a new spatio-temporal vista for analyzing how China, as the economic core and geographical center of a rising Asia, can affect the region's present and future through its spatially ambitious BRI with its long horizon. Taking advantage of this new conceptual place of departure, I follow a small number of recent attempts to trace the stages of China's westward development from its domestic space to its western overland neighbors (Summers, 2016; Yeh and Wharton, 2016) . Moreover, I go a step further to offer a broader and more systematic framework for capturing and explaining China's widespread impact in the Global South that can in turn guide a focused comparison of this impact in Southeast Asia vs Central Asia. Figure 1 presents this framework. and pathway of China's urbanization, development and globalization reflect both the conventional and distinctive drivers and outcomes of these processes. While China had a low level of urbanization and development with a high degree of economic closeness until three and a half decades ago, it has moved rapidly through all three processes with inside and outside consequences that translate into an extensive footprint in the Global South. This calls for taking apart each leg of the triangle and then putting them back together.
Steering and feeding urbanization
China's urbanization has generated a large body of work with a heavy focus on some of the Chinese state takes on a distinctively steering role in using a variety of policies and interventions to guide China's urbanization (Chen, 2014) . Yangtze River Deltas (Chen, 2007) .
As the coastal cities raced far ahead of the interior cities, the Chinese state enhanced its steering role in urban growth by prioritizing key western cities as new hubs of accelerated development to stimulate the catch-up of the vast but lagging interior. By designating Chongqing as a central government municipality in 1997, the state gave this megacity greater autonomy and financial support. Chongqing was allowed to lower enterprise tax from 33 to 24%t, or even to 15% if these projects were located in the city's ETDZ. The state's steering of urbanization not only has involved both the central and local government across regions but also shifted up and down the administrative structure depending on the strategic importance of given cities.
Speed and scale. Given the strong steering role of the state, the fast speed and large scale of China's urbanization is fully expected, and also unprecedented in the Global South. With only 13% of its population being urban around 1950, China was behind India's 17% and comparable to the level of urbanization in some parts of Africa today. With still less than 20% urban around 1980, China has urbanized much faster than India ever since, reaching about 55% urban today relative to India's 35% (Chen, 2014) . In speeding up urbanization and building large cities, China has created a huge demand for imported commodities and energy, mostly from the Global South. From a country with no private cars to the largest auto market in the world, China has dramatically accelerated its petrol consumption. With millions of high-rise and lower buildings shooting up in its hundreds of large cities that have to be cooled and heated, China has led energy consumption by the world's cities.
In addition, the millions of kilometer of fiber optic cables in China's skyscrapers and factories require a lot of copper from large mines in Chile and Zambia. The evidence is clear that the scale and speed of China's urbanization drive its huge demand for imported commodities and energy (see Figure 1 and Campanella, 2008).
As China feeds its urbanization with imported commodities and energy, it has turned around in extending its mode of infrastructure led urbanization to the Global South, especially Africa.
The market share of Chinese companies in Africa's construction sector rose sharply from 9.9% in 2002 to 40.1% in 2011, while the share of US contractors dropped from 24.1% to 6.7% (Huang and Chen, 2016) . A new residential town near Luanda, Angola built by China and empty for some time reminds of the many newly built ghost cities and towns in China (Shepherd, 2015) . Through multiple cross-national channels, China's urbanization not only has fed on commodities and energy from the Global South but also left its strong imprint on the latter's cities.
Connected and transferable development
If urbanization constitutes a place based source and driver of China's domestic transformation and international influence, the development leg of the triangle stretches China's inside-outside connection. On the surface, China seems to have followed the footsteps of export-oriented industrialization previously pursued by the former East Asian tigers such as South Korea and
Taiwan. This strategy made all the sense for China given its then comparative advantages in lower labor and land costs. If we look more closely at China's political institution, territorial and demographic scale and regional diversity, China has traveled a more distinctive path of development closely tied to its urbanization that has ultimately translated into a centrifugal impact in the Global South.
Relative to the East Asian developmental state, the Chinese state has been more purposeful and interventionist since the outset. While China's first SEZs around 1980 were similar to the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) set up in South Korea and Taiwan during 1965-1970, the Chinese government designed and shaped them with two more ambitious goals and supportive strategies. First, the SEZs were intended to experiment with capitalism and market under a centrally planned socialist economy. The zones were located on China's southeast coast, far away from the political and economic centers, to minimize the spatial spill of potential failure.
But they were geographically contiguous and adjacent with Hong Kong and Taiwan, which were willing to move surplus capital and declining factories over the land and sea borders into these zones. The generous tax incentives and bold policy reforms in the SEZs like labor contract singled the state's commitment to make them successful as a longer term model for subsequent development. Second, the Chinese state went much farther than its South Korea and Taiwanese counterparts in building the physical infrastructure needed for much larger scale manufacturing.
The 'first mover' advantages of a few SEZs extended into the follow-up development and prosperity of large coastal cities from the early 1980s into the 1990s. The economic gap between the booming coastal and lagging inland cities grew large. While this was the intended goal of securing quicker and more efficient results from the much better endowed coastal region, it turned out as an unintended consequence of uneven regional development. In response, the Chinese state stepped up its interventionist role around 2000 when it introduced the so-called 'Go West' initiative. It consisted of a set of top-down policies to direct more investment to the interior and to encourage coastal cities to relocate uncompetitive industries to the inland cities.
If the state in late East Asian developing economies needed to be more engaged and interventionist vs. the market (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1994) , the Chinese state has done much more in dealing with serious and complex uneven regional development arising from spatially targeted development in China's diverse economy. The Chinese approach can be characterized as connected and transferable that has facilitated a staged and coordinated westward movement of financial resources and development activities (see Figure 2 ). Besides steering coastal cities and firms to shift investment west, the state has built up and out an extensive highway system and high speed train network, both the world's longest, that link the coastal region to the majority of cities in the interior region (zones 1 and 2 in Figure 2 ). By 2015, China's high speed network consisting of four vertical (north-south) and four horizontal (east-west) trunk routes totaled 19000 kms, 9661 of which carried an average speed of 300 kms/hour. By 2025, the system is projected to expand to eight vertical and eight horizontal trunk routes with more spur lines that will connect all cities of 500000 or more residents and create a 1-4 hour travel radius between all these cities (Xu, 2017) .
Figure 2 about here
With faster and wider transport connections, investment has moved west also as a result of spatially differentiated factors of production between zone 1 and 2. The average manufacturing wage in China's central and western provinces were only 21% and 25% of the coastal average in 2000, and only went up to 39% and 42% in 2013. This wage differential was a key factor in inducing some coastal manufacturers to relocate to China's inland provinces to take advantage of lower costs and policy concessions. By 2015, the value of domestic investment in five central provinces (in zone 2) was 2.5 times that of foreign investment in China (Ann, 2017) . The strong and multifaceted role of the Chinese state in ameliorating uneven regional development further accentuates the necessity of state intervention in late or lagging development beyond the East Asian developmental state over three decades ago (Clifton et al., 2017) . It also serves as a major mechanism for connecting and coordinating infrastructure, jobs, firms and wealth across cities
and regions regarding what Dunford and Liu (2017) call uneven and combined development (U&CD).
To ensure that uneven development can be turned into combined and connected development, the Chinese state has used its still strong top-down administrative level in creating special partnerships between wealth coastal cities and poor border cities in the far west. China's southeast coast to the far western frontier reflects the significance of 'Going West' and 'Going Out' through BRI as linked manifestations of China's development practice and discourse (Yeh and Wharton, 2016) . It accentuates China's new effort to globalize beyond its western borders (from zone 2 into zones 3 and 4, see Figure 2 ).
Driving alternative globalization, regionally
The spatial intersection between China's urbanization and development moving west According to Liu and Dunford (2017) , the most salient feature of the BRI approach to globalization is its inclusivity that differs significantly from the neoliberal version of globalization. It reflects China's emphasis is on strategic international economic partnerships and multilateral credit to address investment, infrastructure, employment and economic development' (p. 325), all of which are critical to the Global South.
Partly motivating this official posture is a set of domestic economic concerns including slower growth, continued production overcapacity, consumption trailing investment and increasingly saturated construction market. By 2006 China were in over-production in 10 industries, especially steel, aluminum, cement, oil refining and wind power (Pieterse, 2015) .
Since 2007 China has lost millions of factory jobs due to the global financial crisis and accelerated automation, creating more surplus labor that can no longer absorbed back in the countryside. During 2014-2016, China had to reduce steel production amounting to 120% of the global total and leading to a loss of 201000 steel workers in 2016 alone. 8 These pressures, some of which structural in economic imbalance and others contingent like the financial crisis (Pieterse, 2015) , have reinforced the powerful push of 'Go West' to open up new investment outlets, trade channels and construction projects. Of all the domestic drivers, China's construction experience and expertise accumulated from building numerous roads and bridges and some extraordinary mega-projects like the Qinghai-Tibet high speed train have turned infrastructure into a main focus and strength of China-led globalization into neighboring Asia.
A pair of case studies
How do we find empirical evidence to interrogate the thesis that China now drives an alternative globalization that originates from deep domestic sources and traverses and influences its western borderlands? Following the relational logic crossing from Figure 1 to 2, I have identified the Southeast Asian and Central Asian subregions (highlighted in Figure 2 ) as empirical cases for a parallel analysis as opposed to a head-to-head comparison. As the guiding rationale for this approach, this pair of cases, in both similar and different ways, can help us to understand how China has realigned the inside and outside of the relationship among its urbanization, development and globalization (Figure 1 ). More specifically, the two cases will illustrate how China, through spatially connected domestic and cross-border zones, is capable of catalyzing catch-up regional development in its remote regions, near abroad and farther beyond (Figure 2 )..
The China-Southeast Asia border region and beyond
In the first case study, I trace the policy and factor mobility from China's coastal region to its border region with mainland Southeast Asia (bolded box in row 3, Figure 2 ). This analysis starts with an acknowledgment that border cities and regions, which were once remote and underdeveloped spaces, have picked up both the speed and scope of urban development. Small and isolated cities and towns have sprung out from once politically trivial and economically marginal landscapes (Chen, 2005) . This process has benefited from targeted state policies, more open borders and improved connectivity of transport networks, especially in China. Ruili looms large in Yunnan's regional role in China's trade with Myanmar. Over 80% of Myanmar's exports to China and 40% of its imports from China come across Yunnan's border (Singh, 2016 Beyond the more conventional cross-border trade, the city of Ruili has become the through point for a gas and oil pipeline that China has built from the port city of Kyaukphyu on Myanmar's west coast to Kunming (see Figure 3 ). The gas pipeline became operational in 2013 and carried 2.86 million tons of gas in 2016, accounting for about 5% of China's total imports.
The oil pipeline, which was completed in 2014, opened in 2017 after a long delay and the Myanmar government had agreed to lower transit fees. The 771-km pipeline is designed to carry 22 million tons of crude a year (about 442000 barrels a day) for the Kunming based refinery that can process 13 million tons annually. 11 This new pipeline allows China to move crude oil from the Middle East overland and faster instead of through the slower and potentially risky narrow Straits of Malacca. More relevant to our framework (Figures 1 and 2) , the pipeline provides a new and added source and route of energy supply for accelerated urbanization and development in southwestern China.
Figures 3 and 4 about here
The smaller and less developed cities on the China-Laos border may catch up to Ruili once an ambitious cross-border China-Laos Railway is built (Figure 4 Given the project cost of $6 billion relative to Laos' annual GDP of $12 billion, Laos has managed to secure a low-interest 20-year loan of $800 million from China's Export-Import Bank and will form a joint venture with China to borrow a lot more to cover the rest of the cost. 13 An optimistic Lao official believes that Laos will be able to pay the loan back within five years by selling to China from the five potash mines yet to be excavated. But given the loan's size relative to Laos' small GDP, pessimistic government officials worry that the risk of financial crisis and high debt will plague Laos after the project is completed. 14 The International Monetary Fund warned in 2017 that Laos' reserves stood at two months of prospective imports of goods and services. It also expressed concerns that public debt could rise to around 70% of the economy.
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It is too early to know if this project will pay off for both sides. For landlocked Laos, the railway makes sense for connecting to outside markets, especially if the planned industrial zone near Vientiane's terminal can stimulate manufactured exports and if millions of high spending Chinese tourists will cross the border on the train. However, a feasibility study by a Chinese company said the railway would lose money for the first 11 years. In the meantime, some Lao farmers are denied sufficient government compensation for giving up their land to the railway.
In contrast, China has brought nearly everything including construction materials and equipment to the Laos project.. At the peak of construction, there will be an estimated 100000 Chinese workers. 16 Thus far, China has already benefited from this mega-project by putting its surplus construction material and workforce to use. In the long run, China is expected to gain more from better overland access to Southeast Asia. This project represents one episode of an unequal China-Asia economic partnership (Holslag, 2015) .
From the China-Central Asia border region to Europe and back
China's 'Go West' initiative favoring the vast interior region has produced a second case of connected and transferable development creating border intensive change and broader Since the announcement of BRI in 2013, Alanshankou has become another key border hub as the transit point for most of the China-Europe cargo trains. This overland train route has different comparative advantages over either air or sea shipping. According to an international logistics expert, 17 rail takes between 23 and 25 days (more hours added than shown in Table 1 due to first and last mile trucking), ocean 50-55 days and air freight around 10 days. In terms of price, rail service charges $4,000 for a 40-foot container (FEU, each carrying 9600 kg of content), compared with $3,000 by sea and $37,000 by air. Rail is much cheaper than air, while ocean is cheaper still but it takes too long. For many time sensitive supply chains today like handsets and laptops (made by HP in Chongqing for Europe), cutting a few days off shipping reduces stock in transit and thus saves much money ( Figure 5 ).
18 China, the line has been carrying up to 20 million tons per year (Fazilov and Chen, 2013) .
As this second case illustrates, the mode and spatial shift of urbanization and development in Figure 2 ).
Yet like the China-Southeast Asia case, challenges face China-Central Asia connections. On the Chinese side, the infrastructure provision in Horgos or Alashankou has far outpaced the shortage of local human capital, forcing Xinjiang government to offer high salaries and housing subsidies to lure talents from interior provinces. Externally, the weaker commitment and fewer resources in Central Asia for cross-border cooperation has created asymmetrical power relations.
Given the inability of the Kazakh government to fully build up the commercial and logistic facilities in its smaller segment of the border cooperation zone, a Chines company has stepped over to build it, thus creating a greater power leverage for China over Kazakhstan.
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Conclusion
In conceptualizing China's domestic transformation and global rise through a triangular lens anchored to urbanization, development and globalization, we begin to see how China has made a big difference to the drivers, mechanisms and outcomes of these three 'master' processes. The
Chinese experience presses us to trace the manifestation of its development and globalization deeply into how China's cities have been (re)built. It also clarifies how the undesirable consequences of dramatic urbanization, especially economic imbalance and regional inequality are being mediated by a strong state's connected and transferable development policies.
Motivated by its spatially phased urbanization and development, China has adopted an alternative and ambitious approach to globalization through BRI that privileges intra-and interregional infrastructure within and across borders for facilitating peripheral urbanization, catch-up development and more inclusive globalization.
I argue that China's urbanization is the deepest source and strongest driver of its westward development and outward globalization, as well as their mutual reinforcement. As the high speed and large scale of urbanization triggered by the SEZs led to the boom of coastal cities and thus regional inequality, the state stepped up its steering role in accelerating and scaling up interior urbanization and extending the largely successful model of SEZs to western border cities. This policy has led to somewhat lagging but not permanently delayed 'peripheral urbanization' by upgrading long neglected small border cities. While they are incomparable to coastal cities like Shenzhen and Shanghai, their importance can no longer measured only in size and functional strength. They have become critical for transmitting China's domestic development impulses out to the underdeveloped border cities and regions of neighboring countries. In other words, the latent strength of once vibrant Silk Road cities like Kashgar and Horgos has been activated and updated to suit the needs of BRI. The faster growth and larger role of these cities are directing our analytical attention from the financial hubs at the top of the global urban hierarchy to the understudied small and border cities at its bottom. It also lends some credence to the notion of 'planetary urbanization' reaching remote places and blurring traditional boundaries (Brenner, 2014) . To the extent that this qualifies as China urbanizing from the Global South to influence other Global South cities, it can make these 'ordinary cities' (Robinson, 2006) City outside Lanzhou (Shepard, 2015) , the capital city of Gansu province bordering Xinjiang.
Globally, China's rapid urbanization has translated into some kind of development opportunity for certain Global South countries through the latter's large exports of commodities and energy.
This development benefit however is unstable as China's slower urbanization and development in recent years has already dampened the growth of the Global South's export of commodities and energy. Due to the contraction of its construction market, China, which accounts for half of the global production of steel and cement, tries to export its surplus steel and cement as part of its push to build more infrastructure in the Global South, and thus may suppress the latter's commodity prices further. In its infrastructure-led globalization under BRI, China also brings larger numbers of its own construction workers to overseas mega-projects like the China-Laos
Railway who interact little with from local communities due to language and cultural barriers.
This has contributed to isolated riots in parts of Central Asia where Chinese workers in Kyrgyzstan were attacked for having more privileged working conditions over domestic workers.
If China continues to create little local employment for large overseas infrastructure projects, it will fall short of securing the full potential positive local impact of these projects in their hosing
Global South countries and cities.
Finally, as China's urbanization and development have become more externally connected, China's growing cross-border ties with Central Asia, and through the latter, with Europe is recentering Eurasia as a geopolitically and now geoeconomically significant region of the world.
As globalization is heading into perhaps a crisis phase, which is debated in this special issue of CJRES, I have presented China as a new power spreading footprints and creating some urbanization and development opportunities in the Global South in a way that may refashion the course of globalization. China's strong influence in the Global South has grown from the coevolution of its domestic urbanization and development. This inside-out process is capable of positioning China as a different kind of globalizer vs. the Global South. By combining an analysis of two cases through the framework (Figure 1 ) and its associated scheme of connected domestic and cross-border regional development (Figure 2 ), I have revealed some hidden and missed intersections and interdependencies between China's domestic economic and spatial restructuring and distinctive approach to globalization using infrastructure as the main driver to 'Go West' in order to go further west via BRI. This process has opened a new research vision and focus onto small but rapidly growing Chines border cities and similar near-abroad cities that will become more important for understanding the shifting spaces of globalization and thus deserve our fresh attention.
China-led globalization, promising and significant as it may be, suffers from both internal and external constraints. Huge investment in building large-scale infrastructure in the Global South has contributed to China's debt rising to 300% of its GDP. From the Global South, for example, the inability of the Sri Lankan government to meet the interest payment on an official $8 billion loan from China for constructing Hambanbota Port, a key link of BRI, has recently allowed the partially state owned China Merchants Ports Holdings to get a controlling stake in this port. 21 While the debt burden may force China to take fewer risks and slow down its infrastructure-driven global strategy, the limited financial ability to service debts on projects like the China-Laos Railway can translate into a broader concern among the Global South about becoming dependent on China. It is up to China to temper its global economic power with a more responsible and equitable approach if it can live up to its professed goal and leading role in fostering South-South cooperation. It adds up to a massive crescent encompassing a number of China's western and southwestern borderlands off Yunnan and Xinjiang. 3. Zone 4 forms the western end of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) including the terminuses and transit points of a growing number of China-Europe freight trains through Central Asia and bound for the latter and its neighbors to the west and south. 4. The four zones are intended to denote the connected and sequential extension of China's economic and infrastructure connections from its east coast to its vast interior and far west under the 'Go West' policies since 2000, and then further west into Central Asia, onto Europe and back with BRI since 2013. 
